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Abstract
While the relationship between domestic and international law provoked constant debate among European
jurists in the interwar years, British thinking is remembered as orthodoxly dualist and practice-focused.
Complicating this narrative, this article revisits W Ivor Jennings’ work, arguing that the domestic and
international were central to his understandings of  interwar legal change in the imperial and international
communities. Part 1 examines Jennings’ seemingly forgotten 1920s works, which analysed constitutional and
international interactions within the rapidly changing imperial system. Part 2 explores Jennings’ turn to
international and domestic forms of  the rule of  law in the lead-up to war, emphasising their British liberal
heritage. Part 3 shows how these conceptions, and their imperial connections, echoed in Jennings’ post-war
projects: a European federation modelled on the empire; and lectures to decolonising states. This reveals both
new angles to Jennings’ work and the importance of  the domestic and international for constitutional legacies
of  empire.
Keywords: international law; domestic law; public law; imperial constitution; interwar
period; W Ivor Jennings.
Introduction: the ‘insularity of Englishmen’
The relationship between domestic and international law provoked constant discussionsfor European jurists working in the interwar period. In the 1920s, the Italian jurist
Dionisio Anzilotti’s new articulation of  Heinrich Triepel’s dualist theory – that international
and domestic laws formed separate systems – was endorsed and developed further by many
jurists throughout Western Europe.1 Against this view, the Austrians Hans Kelsen, Josef
Kunz and Alfred Verdross revived and rearticulated the theory of  monism, arguing that
international law and domestic legal systems were not distinct, but instead elements of  a
NILQ summer 2020
*     Adjunct Lecturer, Faculty of  Law, University of  Tasmania.
1     See Giorgio Gaja, ‘Positivism and dualism in Dionisio Anzilotti’ (1992) 3 European Journal of  International
Law 123.
unified, universal legal system.2 These debates have been read in various ways: as bolstering
the normativity of  law and emphasising its ability to restrain state power;3 as an interwar
legal project to reject the power of  sovereign states by affirming the primacy of
international law over them;4 and as the centrepiece of  a wider legal revolution that
transformed national constitutions into global laws, turned state sovereignty into
democratic sovereignty, and made rights a concern of  and for all human beings as part of
a global legal society.5
At the same time, British jurists seemed, at first glance, to be firmly and in a sense
obviously dualist, with no real option for endorsing monism within their constitutional
orthodoxy. A purportedly international system of  laws or norms could hold no sway over
the endlessly sovereign British Parliament, and the executive’s foreign actions of  signing
treaties could never alter the law of  the land. What Europeans saw as a debate about the
nature of  law, state and international community, the British saw as, at most, a question
of  what English courts would decide to do with the possible ‘rules’ of  international ‘law’.
John Fischer Williams, a prominent UK legal adviser at the League of  Nations (the
League) since the 1920s, wrote in 1939 that ‘however much it may be thought to be
important for the formation of  a true theory of  international law’, the ‘problem’ of  the
relation of  domestic and international law ‘is not very likely to cause embarrassment to
the practitioner or to a court or even an arbitrator’, all of  whom will know and agree on
the law to be applied.6 When Kunz addressed the Grotius Society in London on the
theories of  monism and dualism in 1924, the discussion began with the chair giving
thanks for a ‘wonderful discourse’ and expressing two regrets: the small audience, and the
‘insularity of  Englishmen’ when it came to continental theories – the latter probably
explaining the former.7 British jurists seemed steadfastly and characteristically unengaged
with the philosophical issues of  state and law taking place as the League rose and fell.
Delving deeper than this first glance, this article argues that, far from being insular
theoretical irrelevancies or confined to debates on monism and dualism, the domestic and
international were central to juristic attempts to make sense of  the enormous legal
transformations at the League, throughout the Empire, and within the inauguration of
‘modern’ British constitutional government in the 1920s.8 They were used to formulate
and announce general principles of  government and ordering, internally and globally.
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Many British jurists examined the intertwining of  domestic law, public law and
international law as it related to problems of  empire: Thomas Baty, Arthur Berridale
Keith and Hersch Lauterpacht each published sustained examinations of  these conjoint
problems in the interwar years.9 This article focuses, however, on the influential and yet
understudied constitutional theorist W Ivor Jennings. Writing and teaching at Leeds and
then the London School of  Economics from the 1920s, Jennings was a major figure
critical of  Diceyan constitutional theory and its orthodoxy, as part of  a wider response to
positivism in mainstream legal thought, advocating for functionalist and sociological
accounts of  legal doctrines that paid due regard to the ideological, material and normative
elements of  law and legal systems.10 Jennings is usually remembered as a foundational and
prolific constitutional law theorist who radically reshaped views of  parliamentary, cabinet
and local government and later served as an architect of  decolonisation-era
constitutions.11 But his earliest works were fixed on questions of  international and
imperial constitutional law, and his later appraisals of  the constitutional laws of  the
British Commonwealth and post-war plans for Europe dealt extensively with the
interactions of  domestic and international laws. 
Exploring this development, this article argues that questions of  domestic and
international law were central to Jennings’ efforts to understand the legal aspects of  the
imperial and international communities in the interwar and decolonisation years. This
argument unfolds in three parts. 
Part 1 examines Jennings’ seemingly forgotten earliest works from the mid-1920s: a
series of  French articles that dealt with the difficult mix of  constitutional and
international law in the rapidly changing British Empire through arguments that imperial
constitutional law was the proper, global limit to the international personality of  Britain’s
dominions and protectorates. In these pieces, Jennings examined international personality,
gradual self-government grants, the retention of  executive control over non-white
possessions, and arguments about international limits to prerogative powers. These works
grounded Jennings’ treatment of  the doctrinal issues of  the relationship of  domestic and
international law in the constitution. 
Part 2 shows how these early interests in empire moved towards a parallel emphasis
on the ‘rule of  law’, as a systematic link between domestic and international, with the
British constitution providing a model for international and internal rules of  law. In the
‘Something like the principles of British liberalism’ 159
9     Thomas Baty, ‘Sovereign colonies’ (1921) 34 Harvard Law Review 837; Thomas Baty, ‘Protectorates and
mandates’ (1921) 2 British Yearbook of  International Law 109; Thomas Baty, ‘The structure of  the Empire’
(1930) 12 Journal of  Comparative Legislation and International Law 157; Thomas Baty, International Law in
Twilight (Maruzen 1954) 2ff  (calling the interwar debates on the relation of  municipal and international law,
‘all the most futile word-spinning’: at 3); Arthur Berriedale Keith, ‘The international status of  the
dominions’ (1923) 5 Journal of  Comparative Legislation and International Law 161; Arthur Berriedale
Keith, Letters on Imperial Relations, Indian Reforms, Constitutional and International Law, 1916–1935 (Oxford
University Press 1935); Arthur Berriedale Keith, Letters and Essays on Current Imperial and International Problems,
1935–6 (Oxford University Press 1936); Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of  International
Law (Longmans, Green & Co 1927) (applying theoretical reflections on municipal–international analogies
and connections to the status of  the mandates, and concluding, contra Jennings, that international law
bound the Crown in mandatory administration, and that the League remained sovereign over them: 191–
202); Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of  Law in the International Community (Oxford University Press 1933);
Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Is international law a part of  the law of  England?’ (1939) 25 Transactions of  the
Grotius Society 51. 
10   On the LSE and especially the influence of  Harold Laski’s functionalism, see Martin Loughlin, Public Law
and Political Theory (Clarendon 1992) 169–176. 
11   See further A W Bradley, ‘Sir William Ivor Jennings: a centennial paper’ (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 716;
Adam Tomkins, ‘“Talking in fictions”: Jennings on Parliament’ (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 772.
lead-up to and early years of  the Second World War, Jennings turned to international and
domestic limits on government power in changing conceptions of  the rule of  law, which
were central to his arguments that re-establishing international law required not just
attaining public order in occupied territories, but ‘public order based on something like
the principles of  British liberalism’. 
Part 3 examines the legacies of  these theoretical commitments, examining how this
concept of  public order and British liberalism played out in two of  Jennings’ post-war
intellectual projects: a European federation, whose constitution was based on the ‘lessons’
of  the interwar imperial constitution, and a set of  lectures to decolonising states urging
them to hew to British parliamentarism against socialist international designs. 
Jennings’ work on the international and domestic involved a variety of  efforts to
theorise and justify new visions of  law, government and ordering amid the rapidly
changing and, later, dissolving, empire. This new emphasis also reminds us that the
confluence and interactions between the fields of  public and international law, as well as
their joint imperial imbrications, are not new or recent, but rather built deeply into at least
the early twentieth-century foundations of  today’s theory and practice; one important
constitutional legacy of  empire.
1 Jennings’ empire: dominion and mandate, 1920–1938
The immediate outcome of  the First World War was the collapse of  the Russian, German,
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and their subsequent partitions into nation-
states or new supervised colonial dependencies under the new ‘mandate’ system of  the
League. As the first international institution to harbour aspirations of  global membership
and influence, the League focused the attention of  Western international lawyers and
diplomats. It also formed the institutional point of  ‘inclusion’ for new nations and was
the place to debate pressing questions around the protection of  minorities, the
administration of  former empires, the international economic system and the
development of  international law.12 But the 1920s also inaugurated the rapid legal
transformation of  the British Empire through gradual cessions of  self-government to the
dominions and the establishment of  the Irish Free State on an equal footing with them,
combined with repression and continued Crown ‘guidance’ in parts of  India and Africa,
and in the new acquisitions of  mandates taken from the empires of  the defeated Central
Powers in the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific. The vague questions about
international personality and constitutional links between the polities of  the British
Empire that burned throughout the war were intensified by the establishment of  the
League. Which dominions could represent themselves at the League? Did they appear as
part of  the Empire or independently? Could they conduct independent foreign policy?
These questions were gradually, partially resolved by successive imperial conferences in
the 1920s and 1930s. This section explores how Jennings’ examinations of  changing ideas
about the interaction of  domestic and international were foundational in these wider
transformations in empire, parliament, dominions and mandates. 
The questions debated at the 1920s imperial conferences motivated Jennings’ first
academic works; a series of  seemingly now-forgotten articles on international legal
aspects of  the British Empire and Commonwealth, based on London lectures, and
translated for the major French international law journal Revue Generale de Droit
International et Legislation Comparée (RDILC). These pieces explored the international
personality of  the dominions, arguing that their status was, ultimately, a matter of  imperial
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constitutional law and not international law, but basing that argument on a subtle account
of  the interaction of  principles from both of  these fields. Jennings sought to explain the
varieties of  international personality throughout the Empire as stemming from its
complex, various constitutional orderings and degrees of  self-government possessed by
the entities which formed it and the retention of  executive control over non-white
possessions. Jennings sought to convince readers that the Empire’s juridical relations
overrode international law and, in some cases, created new categories of  polity previously
unknown to international law. In a sense, his argument reflected both an internationalising
and localising of  the British constitution: making it relevant and resistant to new
international law concepts, and binding and shaping the constitutional and international
development of  the Empire’s constituent members. In the early 1930s, Jennings saw this
imperial rule returning to influence government and the constitution at home.
The idea of  international law constraining or shaping the powers of  the Crown was
the subject of  Jennings’ first published work, which built on his essay as the Whewell
Scholar in International Law at Cambridge. Examining the right of  angary, which related
to the interaction of  statutory, prerogative and international law rights to seize foreign
property, Jennings examined two major decisions in which English courts held that
international law doctrines on angary formed part of  the law of  England and, thus,
corresponded to the prerogative right to requisition neutral goods for the defence of  the
realm.13 Jennings endorsed Westlake’s view that English courts enforce rights in
international or domestic law where they fall within jurisdiction, subject to the sovereign’s
incapacity to, in Westlake’s words, ‘divest or modify private rights by treaty’ and that
courts cannot question acts of  state.14 Jennings noted, however, that:
[t]he word “rights” is here used in rather a peculiar sense. Rights are given by
International Law only to States, whereas Municipal Courts usually invoke
International Law in suits by an individual. What is meant, therefore, is that
Municipal Courts must recognise a right where a rule of  International Law gives
an individual a benefit; as, for example, where an ambassador claims a diplomatic
immunity.15
Jennings read this in a language of  private law, as a coordination of  benefits and
compensation. A state’s international law right to seize the property of  neutrals within its
territory rests in the Crown and executive government, and a right of  compensation rests
with the owner.16 Jennings thought that this should translate into English constitutional
law as international law shaping the prerogative: there ‘ought therefore to be a prerogative
right of  the Crown to seize the property in accordance with the rules of  International
Law … there is nothing in the common law inconsistent with such a right, nor is there
any statute to prevent such rights from taking effect’.17 The Crown’s prerogative rights,
then, are constrained or moulded by the rules of  international law, though might be
limited further by statute.
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Jennings’ next works delved much more deeply into the relationship of  Crown,
empire and international law. The first piece examined the international status of  the
dominions after the 1926 Imperial Conference, responding to articles by the influential
Belgian jurist Henri Rolin and the more obscure Canadian political scientist C D Allin.
Jennings rejected Rolin’s argument that the dominions had no international personality
and went further than Allin’s contention that they had some degree of  international
personality, but not to the extent of  full sovereign states. Jennings contended instead that
following the 1926 Conference the dominions held, under international law, the same
international status as the UK, and that this status was ‘limited by the superior law of  the
community of  states conventionally called, erroneously, the British Empire’.18
Jennings’ argument built on a disagreement with Rolin’s view of  the meaning of
‘state’. Whereas Rolin saw states as juridically distinct, supreme organs that gain their
powers by expressing the will of  a people, rather than from delegation by another higher
body, for Jennings this did not reflect the reality of  state formation and would make, for
example, non-revolutionary emergences of  states impossible: ‘the source of  the institution
is immaterial. What is important is knowing whether the power is exercised by the
institution for itself, yet on behalf  of  a third party.’19 Rolin, Jennings argued, had fallen
into an error common to jurists unfamiliar with British juridical thought by confounding
a theory of  law with the facts of  reality and the conventions of  the British constitution.
Put another way, Jennings placed the operation of  the British imperial constitution over
the concepts of  international law.
Jennings’ own view of  the dominions’ status moved between British imperial–
constitutional law and international law. While the constitutional law of  the British
Empire was developed by judicial interpretations of  law from an earlier era in which the
King exercised governmental powers and the people were merely consulted, the
contemporary reality was that Cabinet and the Prime Minister – not legal categories and
‘unknown to English law’ – possess and exercise those powers. Likewise, the full
sovereign status of  the dominions rested on their ability and permission to exercise those
powers, most crucially for international personality, the ability to conduct foreign
relations, which was granted to them by imperial constitutional law. British constitutional
law theoretically made the dominions ‘complete dependents’ under the English
government, but they are practically never subjected to that control.20
Jennings emphasised that the international law analysis must not look to this ‘theory
of  the Constitution’ but instead to the ‘real authority of  the Dominion governments’.21
If  they lack the ‘necessary authority to accomplish international acts’, they cannot be
recognised as having a personality distinct from Britain, but if  they do have ‘the capacity
to maintain international relations’ then the only element missing from their full
international personality is recognition of  that fact by other states.22 Jennings thought
that that recognition had been accorded to the dominions by most of  the important states
in Europe and America.23 Moreover, this was the position of  the Empire, evidenced by
the report adopted by the 1926 Conference, which ‘first established the general principle
of  independence’ among the dominions, and ‘then acknowledged that theories of  law and
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 71(2)
18   W Ivor Jennings, ‘Le Statut des Dominions et La Conference Imperiale de 1926’ (1927) 8 RDILC 397, 398
(translations of  Jennings’ French articles are my own).
19   Ibid 399 (emphasis original).
20   Ibid 400.
21   Ibid.
22   Ibid.
23   Ibid.
162
forms of  government (but not practice) do not conform to this principle’ and ‘finally
suggest[ed] means of  attenuating this divergence’.24 Jennings’ emphasis, then, was on the
practical operation of  domestic and imperial law, over the theory-fixation of  other
international law jurists.
The remainder of  Jennings’ argument explored those practical operations in detail,
though with some examination of  the conceptual changes announced by the Conference.
While, in keeping with British tradition, the Conference refused to countenance a written
constitution for the Empire, it did seek to define the relationship of  the UK and the
dominions by a general proposition: 
There are autonomous communities within the Empire, equal in their status, no
one subordinate to another from the particular point of  view of  their internal
affairs, although united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely
associating as members of  the British community of  nations.25
Jennings saw no contradiction between independence and membership of  the Empire,
insisting that the it was ‘in fact’ a society of  free nations, linked by common places and
shared history, and ‘a loyalism towards a shared sovereign and a tradition of  liberty and
democratic government, transmitted from generation to generation’.26
While dominion parliaments remained theoretically subject to the laws of  the British
Parliament, in practice that was of  little importance: contemporary British legislation did
not apply generally to the dominions, and they made their own laws.27 This independence
followed into their international lives and was the basis of  their juridical equality with
Britain itself. After examining the international relations of  the various dominions – their
negotiation of  treaties with foreign states outside the Empire, their modes of
representation, their domestic ratifications, and their position in relation to wider
conventions (as Jennings put it, those ‘international acts between governments that
generally do not necessitate legislative intervention, but have a purely political objective’)28
– Jennings concluded that the dominions and the UK held the same status in international
law. But the particulars of  that international status were still limited and shaped by the
presence of  imperial constitutional ties: ‘the rights of  different parts of  the Empire are
limited by the personality of  the Empire, because from the point of  view of  questions of
interest to a part of  the empire, there is a unity’.29 This unity meant treaties relevant to
more than one part of  the Empire bound the entirety, and that questions about the
relations between parts of  the Empire – ‘conventions, disputes, etc’ – ‘are not regulated by
international law, but by the constitutional laws and customs of  the Empire’.30
In his 1928 piece ‘International personality in the British Empire’, Jennings broadened
his analysis to argue that the British arrangements had now reshaped international law,
conceptualising dominion–imperial relations as a new upheaval and challenge to old
outdated notions of  international personality. Historically, all international legal persons
were ‘homogeneous States’, and the nature of  international personality was not a
complicated question, with new states admitted not only by satisfying ‘certain
philosophical principles’ but also because they appeared to be similar to current
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members.31 When international organisation and the state form became more complex,
fundamental ideas about the nature of  states became relevant to international personality. 
As applied to the British Empire, Jennings argued that it was ‘an organisation of  a
character so complex that it is impossible to examine the personality of  its different parts’
without first establishing the principles of  international personality.32 Jennings now saw
the British Empire as a formerly unitary state ‘in transition’, owing to the partial,
somewhat unclear, international capacities of  the dominions.33 But the international
implications of  this transition was not a question of  international law but one of  imperial
constitutional law: 
We are now in a state of  transition. But the principle is clear. No part of  the
Empire can be recognised as having an international capacity greater than that
which it possesses constitutionally. To admit a British community to a power that
it does not have constitutionally is to intervene in the internal government of  the
British Empire, and this is contrary to international law.34
Here, Jennings raised the international law principle of  non-intervention in internal
affairs to place imperial constitutional law over the other ordinary principles of
international law and give it an international and absolute effect. Jennings saw each
dominion’s constitutional capacities as the ‘extreme limit’ on any possible recognition by
other states. This mixed and went beyond international and constitutional ideas of
personality: ‘The situation that has been examined here does not fit into the normal
classifications of  international law’, he noted and concluded by stating ‘[t]he distribution
of  personality that is thus laid down does not fit within the classification seen so far in
international law’.35
By the mid-1930s, following the passage of  the Statute of  Westminster, the kinds of
restrictions that Jennings had theorised as following from imperial conventions, the
practical operations of  the dominions, and the statements in the Imperial Reports, were
solidified into clearer doctrines of  imperial constitutional law.36 Jennings theorised the
legal structure of  the British Empire as slowly disintegrating, moving from the 1914
foundation of  a Parliament and Crown that could, in principle, legislate and govern in any
part of  the Empire, through a severe weakening in the 1920s that had, by the early 1930s,
given way to a stark contrast between the constitution within the British Isles and that
which barely bound what was now the Commonwealth. While the British constitution
was ‘a complex of  institutions, laws, conventions and practices’ that made it ‘one of  the
most detailed and closely co-ordinated in the world’, the ‘Constitution of  the British
Commonwealth’ had ‘undergone a process of  disintegration on the legal side which has
not been met by any corresponding process of  integration on the side of  convention or
practice. It does indeed exist, but its limbs are so weak that it seems that a breath would
cause them to break.’37 This weakness followed from the Statute of  Westminster’s
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removal of  the presumption that any UK Act of  Parliament would extend or be deemed
to extend to a dominion as part of  its law, unless expressly stated in the Act and requested
and consented to by the dominion.38 Practically, Jennings thought, the connections and
collaborations between Commonwealth nations were now questions of  international
cooperation akin to ordinary foreign affairs: ‘neither an Imperial Federation nor a
Zollverein [customs union] is practical politics. The question is now to secure collaboration
among six or seven autonomous nations.’39
Beyond the Commonwealth, however, Jennings argued that British Crown powers
over protectorates and mandates remained shaped and limited by imperial constitutional
law alone, even though the claim to govern those mandates originated in international law
doctrines and the League’s mandatory grants. This approach shows the endurance of
aspects of  Jennings’ late 1920s views on imperial control, even as the Empire had turned
to Commonwealth. In the 1938 Constitutional Laws of  the Commonwealth, which relied more
heavily on the judicial decisions compiled by his co-author C M Young40 than on William
Anson and A B Keith’s treatises used in the earlier articles, Jennings contended that the
earlier doctrine of  incorporation from West Rand and Commercial and Estates Co of  Egypt was
now expressed too widely, an error partly stemming from changes in the Empire since
those cases were decided. While there is a presumption that international law and English
law are not incompatible, the jurisdiction of  English courts to decide any dispute about
which law applies flows from the jurisdiction of  the Crown: ‘The jurisdiction of  the
Crown, in which is included the jurisdiction of  the Queen’s Courts, has thus to be decided
by English law. A jurisdiction may be lawful according to English law and yet unlawful
according to international law’.41 These recent decisions had confirmed that jurisdiction
was ultimately up to the Crown, subject to any statutory limits on that power, and this
extended to international status and the government of  protectorates.42
This had effects for the status of  mandate territories. Contra W E Hall and Henry
Jenkyns, who in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw protectorate
government as a question of  international law, Jennings insisted it was one of
constitutional law. Whereas they had begun with international law doctrines on when a
state might exercise its powers within the territory of  another state, for the ‘English lawyer’
the starting question is ‘to determine what powers the Crown possesses by English law
outside British territory’: this was solely about constitutional law, and the Crown ‘is not
bound even by the treaty by which the jurisdiction is first acquired in the international
sense’.43 Governance of  mandates was the same as the position over protectorates. The
Crown’s acceptance of  the League’s mandate was a grant of  jurisdiction and, while British
obligations to the League were ‘international obligations’ and the Crown’s Orders in
Council provided that the terms of  the mandate should not be broken, this only reflected
the Crown being ‘anxious’ that Britain’s international obligations be kept.44 As a matter of
constitutional law the mandate did not bind the Crown. 
‘Something like the principles of British liberalism’
38   Ibid.
39   Ibid 474.
40   See W Ivor Jennings, Constitutional Laws of  the Commonwealth (3rd edn, Clarendon Press 1957) ‘Preface’ v.
41   W Ivor Jennings and C M Young, Constitutional Laws of  the Commonwealth (Clarendon Press 1938) 16.
42   Ibid 16–17. See also W Ivor Jennings, ‘Dominion legislation and treaties’ (1937) 15 Canadian Bar Review
455.
43   Jennings and Young (n 41) 17, referring to W E Hall, A Treatise on the Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of  the
British Crown (Clarendon Press 1894); Henry Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction beyond the Seas (Clarendon
Press 1902).
44   Jennings and Young (n 41) 17.
165
This supremacy of  imperial constitutional law over international obligations followed,
for Jennings, from the absolute nature of  the Crown’s powers. Jennings was quick to
clarify that this did not allow the Crown or governor to act as an ‘uncontrolled despot’:
administration by the Colonial Office still took place through law, according to the local
constitution and legal system and subject to appeals to the Privy Council.45 The Crown
was ‘a legal abstraction’, and government was essentially ‘that provided by the local
constitution’ – though certainly still ‘subject to the control of  the Government of  the
United Kingdom’.46 Imperial government was theoretically local, practically still subject
to the control of  Britain, and, either way, entirely freed of  the international law that was
the original basis of  that claim to govern. In the parts of  the world where it continued,
British imperial government was legitimated by international law, but only constrained by
British constitutional law. 
2 Jennings’ orthodoxies: internal and international rules of law, 1935–1941
This part examines how Jennings’ early interests shifted towards a parallel examination of
various forms of  the ‘rule of  law’. For Jennings, it involved analysing the impact of
imperial government on constitutional arrangements in the British Isles and his
acknowledgment that Parliament was practically constrained by international law. These
early points led him to use the British imperial constitution of  the mid-1930s as a model
for liberal international order, arguing during the Second World War that re-establishing
international law and the domestic laws of  occupied nations meant more than a simple
vision of  law and order, and instead a rule of  law ‘based on something like the principles
of  British liberalism’. 
Jennings’ late 1920s works on the difficulties of  imperial–international law formed an
early foundation for his later, wider rebuke to the gaps and inadequacies of  Dicey’s late
nineteenth-century vision of  the British constitution. This was partly about a change in
the municipal. By the 1920s, these problems had become so glaring as to make Dicey’s
work, in Jennings’ view, of  little contemporary use, despite Dicey’s thorough enduring
influence.47 As Jennings wrote in the preface to the 1959 edition of  Law and the
Constitution, if  there were any heretics in 1930s English constitutional thought, ‘they were
to be found among those who regarded themselves as “orthodox”’.48 That orthodoxy
took Dicey as essentially correct but in need of  qualification and updating. To Jennings,
teaching and writing in the late 1920s, local government, cabinet conventions and the
relations between the UK and the Commonwealth simply ‘could not satisfactorily be
fitted’ within the Diceyan orthodoxy.49
Jennings’ other 1930s interest was in placing local government law within the ambit
of  public law teaching, scholarship and practice that reflected the new importance of  the
‘municipal’. What is significant about this shift in both policy and theory is that for
Jennings it reflected a turning inward of  both Parliament and the executive, away from
their imperial functions and toward a domestic sphere now characterised by the provision
of  social services and the implementation of  economic reform that reflected the new idea
of  ‘administration’ previously and famously rejected by Dicey as inapposite to the British
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system. His own autobiographical writings insist that it was the importance of  local
government to the practice of  his students at Leeds – rather than the influence of  Harold
Laski and left-wing politics – that set him on the path against Dicey and towards writing
The Law and the Constitution.50 Jennings saw the municipality as the place where urban life
is regulated. Local government law was, as he put it in 1939, ‘the means by which urban
life becomes possible’.51 The rapid expansion of  the legal powers of  authorities
responsible for delivering socially progressive policy and services was the ‘municipal
revolution’, seeded in the 1835 establishment of  the first municipal corporations.52
Jennings saw this as a shift from an old nineteenth-century imperial executive to a wider
use of  discretion in policy implementation at home. The nineteenth-century executive
was tasked with domestic policing, government of  the colonies, control of  the armed
forces and levying small taxes: ‘“Executive” was, indeed, the correct word. For the
internal functions of  the State were largely ministerial’, and discretion was mostly
afforded to judges, while executive officers had limited discretionary power, except for
foreign relations and the military. The rise of  public services – health, education,
employment exchanges, housing, public transport – had expanded the administrative
‘machinery’ since the 1870s.53 Jennings incorporated them into an account of  the
constitution not by their functions, which he saw as an unclear mix of  policing, regulation
and the ‘general external functions of  the old “executive”’ – that is, its colonial role – but
instead by their new institutional locations: the central government, independent statutory
authorities and local governments.54
Parliament was also changing. By the late 1930s, Jennings agreed that Parliament was
constrained ‘in practice’ by the rules of  international law, but that the incorporation of
international law into British law – as ‘part of  the law of  England’ – meant only that British
law is ‘presumed not to be contrary to international law’.55 Jennings expressed this as a
series of  assumptions about the territorial extent of  laws, jurisdiction over the seas and the
powers of  the crown – as including those held by a government under international law,
and not including powers which would be contrary to international law.56 This amounted
to the doctrine that English courts will give English law the meaning ‘most consistent’ with
international law.57 In a lengthy note, Jennings disagreed with Lauterpacht’s 1935 view that
customary international law was part of  the common law. While Jennings agreed that
courts would not presume a contradiction between custom and the common law, ‘if  it
means that whatever is accepted customary international law is per se part of  the common
law, so that a modern rule of  international law overrides principles already established by
decisions of  the courts, it cannot, in my opinion, be accepted’, and, moreover, the cases
quoted by Lauterpacht did not support his apparent view.58 Instead, Jennings emphasised
that the common law provided a superior source of  protection for foreigners. In the
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absence of  legislation and even if  international law allowed it, the Crown could not
abrogate common law rights of  foreigners like assembly or due process.59
Jennings conceptualised the constitutional position of  international law, however, as a
constitutional convention rather than firm law, and one that allowed Parliament to
legislate itself  into actions or internal laws that might constitute breaches of  international
obligations, though practically and normatively constraining it from doing so:
[A]ny breach of  international law by the United Kingdom will give to the country
injured a claim against this country which may be enforced by any means
available by international law for the time being (such as consideration of  the
matter by the Council or Assembly of  the League of  Nations or by the
Permanent Court of  International Justice, or even, subject to the Kellogg Pact,
war). This means that the United Kingdom, through legislation enacted by
Parliament, may be liable to give redress to a foreign Power. This does not
impose any legal obligation upon Parliament. But it means in fact that Parliament
will not deliberately, and ought not to, pass any legislation which will result in a
breach of  international law. Consequently international law limits the power of
Parliament through the operation of  constitutional convention.60
A second set of  international–imperial conventions grew out of  the constitutional
relations with the dominions and the mandate territories. Regarding the mandates,
however, Jennings maintained his earlier view that, as a matter of  constitutional law, their
government was ‘within the entire discretion of  the Crown’ and, while the UK was bound
by the terms of  the mandates concluded and approved by the League Council, ‘[t]he fact
that the obligations arise out of  international law makes no difference’ to this absolute
constitutional discretion.61
Jennings’ account of  international law and imperial and mandate relations rested on a
view of  the rule of  law that, innovatively for his time, held both internal and international
forms. Beginning the chapter on English constitutional law with the rule of  law, Jennings
started not with England’s constitutional history or the major principles, but instead with
ideas of  law and order in the context of  instability at the international level. Jennings
stated that the idea that it is ‘necessary to establish “the rule of  law” in international
relations’ is a recurring suggestion in contemporary discussions; that international law
exists but is not obeyed, that diplomacy is based on force rather than law, and that
establishing the ‘rule of  law’ would lead to order, peace and the settlement of
international disputes according to law.62 For Jennings, this appeal ‘expressly or impliedly
draws a parallel between international society and the internal society of  a modern
State’.63 International society today, however, resembled feudalism, where ‘lawless and
law-abiding barons alike felt that their security rested primarily upon the number of  their
retainers and the impregnability of  their castles’.64 The difference is that the ‘natural
solution’ to this problem, stemming from Roman imperial traditions, was to recognise ‘the
authority of  an overlord, a king or an emperor’.65 Jennings goes on to contend that the
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rule of  law was largely established internally, despite civil unrest, in the simple sense of
‘the existence of  public order’, which depended on the existence of  a superior power to
use force to stop lawlessness: ‘One lawless man, like one lawless State, can destroy the
peace of  a substantial part of  his world. Force is necessary only for the lawless and can
be used only if  the lawless are the exceptions.’66 While this basic sense of  ‘law and order’
has been established in most states and is a ‘universally recognised principle’, in Britain,
Jennings insisted, this experience had been one of  liberalism or liberal-democracy that is
not necessarily shared by other nations. 
In Jennings’ final analysis, the rule of  law in the simple sense of  law and order is
present in ‘all civilised States’ and encompasses a range of  governmental forms, including
non-democratic and aggressively expansionist states.67 If  it means something more than
that, it must rest on a more comprehensive theory of  government which usually ‘includes
notions which are essentially imprecise’ – control of  the executive, limited legislative
powers, and so on – but which are besides the central requirement that it be based on the
‘active and willing consent and cooperation of  the people’; an anti-formalist, substantive
account of  democracy.68
During the Second World War, Jennings revisited this vision of  the rule of  law and
re-drew it as holding an essentially British – rather than generically democratic –
substance that emphasised parliamentary control of  the executive. He drew close parallels
between domestic and international versions of  the rule of  law, contending that its
conceptual content was fundamentally British, contained in British constitutional and
parliamentary history ‘and the works of  publicists who consciously or unconsciously
provide ammunition for political artillery’.69 Moving beyond the contemporary view that
Dicey’s popularisation expressed its essence, Jennings instead traced the rule of  law’s
history through Aristotle, Occam and the Revolutionary Settlement of  1688 to the
contemporary discretionary government most clearly seen in the expansion of  social
services, which required ‘a new technique of  government and a new alignment of
governmental powers’.70 Arbitrariness, and not discretion as such, was where Jennings
found the breakdown of  the rule of  law, and Dicey’s failure was in missing the ‘most
fundamental element’ in British controls of  discretion, namely the control of  government
by Parliament, and the control of  Parliament by the people.71 Seeing the rule of  law as
generally controls ‘exercised by one governmental authority upon another’72 – neither
necessarily by a court, nor necessarily total73 – Jennings ultimately concluded that
executive wartime powers, while ‘as vast as those of  any dictator’, remained subject to
parliamentary oversight and control, which he insisted would prevent any abuses.74
Earlier in the piece, and more striking, was Jennings’ treatment of  the international
aspects of  the rule of  law. Noting again that the phrase ‘rule of  law’ has ‘mainly’ been used
in the context of  international affairs to mark its absence between states, the lack of
recourse through the League, and the outbreak of  the war to ‘re-establish the rule of  law’,
Jennings saw it as holding here ‘much the same meaning as “law and order”’, implying that
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diplomacy should be regulated by international law not force.75 But Jennings insisted on a
more capacious meaning that linked international and internal concepts of  the rule of  law:
Yet, the rule of  law has always meant more than order. International law should
be re-established, not because it is law, but because it is good law. The Germans
have re-established law and order throughout western Europe, but no British
politician outside the internment camps has yet praised Hitler for establishing the
rule of  law. On the contrary, it is asserted that the law is the rule of  the despot
and the order the tyranny of  the tyrant. In truth, it is the immediate aim of
British strategy to create disorder in the occupied territories in order that the
oppressed peoples may re-establish the rule of  law. The rule of  law means,
therefore, not merely public order, but public order based on something like the
principles of  British liberalism.76
This formulation, reminiscent of  his 1938 account but applied to the realities of  the war
itself, saw Jennings unsurprisingly denying tyranny the character of  the rule of  law; as
merely public order that lacks the substance of  ‘something like’ British liberalism. In
doing so he mixed international and domestic conceptions without much clarity about the
content or basis of  the international version. It seems to need not just law and order, but
also to be based – at the very least – on whatever principles the ‘comity of  nations’ has
given to it, though ideally move closer to British liberal conceptions. Adherence to this
British content seems, then, to be Jennings’ real prerequisite to ‘re-establishing’ the ‘good
law’ of  international law.
3 Jennings at the end of empire: new commonwealths, 1940–1960
This part turns to how Jennings used the conceptualisations of  the domestic and
international from Parts 1 and 2 in two projects for the commonwealths of  the post-war
world. Jennings’ wartime plans for a European federation modelled its laws on the British
Empire’s international–imperial experience in the 1920s. His post-war theorising around
the constitutions for decolonising states aimed to fit them into a renewed
Commonwealth. Instead of  ruminating on their new international legal personality or
freedom in domestic law-making, Jennings urged them to stay with British parliamentary
traditions and resist the scourge of  international socialism. 
In 1941, Jennings sketched a plan for a federation of  Western Europe, including a
draft of  its constitution. This ‘federal union’ would improve on the failures of  the League,
but against those who thought international government only meant replacing sovereign
states with a world order – an ideal of  ‘insuperable’ difficulties – Jennings insisted that a
Western European federation of  democratic governments was the only true solution to
many of  the world’s problems.77 Its practicability depended on persuading nations to
send representatives to an international conference to draft a constitution, which meant
persuading public opinion in these nations that this was both urgent and essential, which,
in turn, depended on aiming at a constitution that would work to solve these problems
without calling for ‘too great a sacrifice’ in the sovereignty of  federating states.78 For
practical reasons, some flexibility in national forms of  internal government would be
allowed within the Federation, but in broad terms its constituent parts had to be
democratic. Jennings insisted that centralising control over defence and foreign affairs for
a single Western European bloc, which would attend the League of  Nations in unity, was
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fundamental to peace.79 Some form of  coordinated control over colonial possessions and
economic relations within and beyond the Federation was central to avoid repeating the
financial and military disasters of  the interwar period.80 These formed the pillars of
Jennings’ view. But he also insisted that it was not a utopian project. The ‘empty
sentiments’ and ‘vague Utopianism’ that reflected a poor understanding of  the practical
and theoretical problems involved in such a union were a serious danger.81 To clarify
these practicalities, and outline how powers over foreign affairs, defence and some
controls on economic relations and colonies might operate, Jennings turned back to the
only other international organisation he thought effective and guiding: the British
Empire’s interwar experience of  global order.
Analogies with the Empire and illustrations from its successes and failures form much
of  the arguments that followed. Pleading for the practicality of  the scheme and exhorting
the anglophone world to advocate for it, Jennings argued that just as the ‘systems’ from
the ‘Mediterranean to the Arctic’ are ‘copies’ of  the British system adapted to national
characters and ‘conditions of  national life’, his plan was ‘based essentially on the British
tradition’ as it was ‘adapted by British people’ to the conditions of  North American and
Australia and, thus, the ‘initiative’ for the scheme must come from those peoples.82 But
the Commonwealth would also endure and be accommodated into the Federation. He
insisted that nothing in the plan would formally detract from the King’s powers or
interfere with imperial–dominion relations – ‘The Statute of  Westminster of  1931 would
not be amended even by the omission of  a comma’ – but practically it would significantly
change Commonwealth intergovernmental relations: the UK could not defend the
dominions except through the Federation’s processes, and citizenship and immigration
status would change, though this would not follow if  the dominions were to join the
Federation themselves.83
Following this imperial guide, Jennings’ vision for the interaction of  domestic and
international in his European Federation strongly resembled the imperial–dominion
arrangements in their 1920s forms, albeit here solidified in a written international
constitution, rather than the policy preferences of  the Empire and its areas of
disengagement with dominion governments. Major foreign policy decisions would be for
a Council of  Ministers and President, to the exclusion of  any ‘direct political relations’
between individual federated states and outsiders.84 But plenty of  international questions
would be reserved to the internal systems of  these states. There are ‘many subjects of
international discussion’ that would remain ‘entirely within the jurisdiction of  the
federated States’: public health, extradition, mutual enforcement of  foreign judgments,
bankruptcy, patents, trademark, copyright and communications.85 Balancing this internal
jurisdiction with the problems usually solved in single-nation federations by delegating all
international powers to the Federation prompted Jennings to draft a ‘limited treaty-
making power’, granted to the constituent states, but subject to the Federation’s control.86
The Federation would also hold a legislative power to implement major treaties it signed,
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and Jennings contemplated a convention for the unification of  laws between the
constituent states.87
In general layout, Jennings’ Federation plan presaged many of  the major elements of
the post-war European integration projects and the eventual EU. Yet, Jennings’ hope for
a commonwealth with empire enduring alongside these European projects did not come
to pass. Indeed, it is in the coda of  Jennings’ final works that his views on the
international and domestic shift at the end of  empire. They focused primarily on the
kinds of  domestic orders that the former colonies should aspire to adapt to their local
conditions, mostly along the lines of  the British constitution, though offering little
guidance on their newly acquired rights and duties under international law. Jennings was
extensively and personally involved in decolonisation as a constitutional architect.88 His
last works turned to vast statements of  legislative authority and executive power – now
asserted by newly decolonised states – but seeing new roots for them in the history of
British colonial law-making. 
In the 1961 second edition of  Parliament, Jennings began now with Coke’s early
seventeenth-century vision of  Parliament’s authority as ‘transcendent and absolute’, not
exactly rejecting it, but pointing to its clear functional limits while giving it theoretically
global reach: ‘The legislative authority of  Parliament extends to all persons, to all places
and to all events; but the only legal systems which it can amend are those which recognise
its authority.’89 Parliament is not subject to any ‘physical’ limitation, only those limits
recognised by law. Law here meant simply the authority that peoples would practically
accept and consent to; ‘convenient general propositions’ not entirely removed from social
and political realities, but ‘not necessarily bear[ing] any very close’ relation to them.90
Jennings noted that, regardless of  the claims of  statutes still on the books that purported
to bind ‘subjects of  the Crown in America’, this evidently could not include former
colonial possessions over which the UK once exercised jurisdiction.91
As part of  this view, Jennings once more contested Dicey’s arguments that the rule of
law prohibited wide discretionary authority and was not well served by delegated
legislation. Jennings contended that this ignored the vast history of  extra-parliamentary
law-making outside the British Isles,92 which was, amidst decolonisation, in the process
of  being dismantled and transferred to new states. Jennings listed the range of  Crown
rights to legislate in conquered or ceded territories where no local legislature had been set
up or the right to legislate reserved, the Crown’s wide powers to ‘act as [it] pleases outside
British territory and against foreigners [which] follows from principles of  the common
law’, orders binding even British subjects in protectorates, trust territories, and Crown
rights to legislate for certain settled colonies.93 Those powers, formerly exercised for
empire, which excluded international law’s application in favour of  imperial constitutional
law, were now to be held by these new sovereigns. Jennings’ vision, then, was still for a
world order that based its idea of  the international on both ‘something like the principles
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of  British liberalism’ as well as something like the principles – to him, practised and
proven – of  the British Empire. 
As both of  these foundational orthodoxies began to slip away in the 1960s, Jennings’
focus turned to delivering lectures that buttressed and explained his work drafting new
constitutions for decolonising states.94 Amidst wide discussions of  diversities in local
populations, educational programmes, responsible government, the difficulties of
constitution-making removed from local conditions, and the constitutional documents
themselves, Jennings almost entirely eschewed any discussion of  international law for
these new states. Instead, Jennings reflections on late 1940s Asian decolonisation
concluded with an examination of  Commonwealth (rather than international) relations,
and the suggestion that the historical and economic ties of  the Commonwealth ought to
guide newly independent India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, alongside the likely benefits of  a
general alignment with British views of  the ‘power politics’ of  the early 1950s Cold War.95
By the 1960s and the era of  African decolonisation, Jennings’ (rather condescending)
concluding suggestions would briefly note that new African states ‘have a part to play in
the international scene’.96 But Jennings also thought that African leaders should treat
their new international powers as carefully as their fledgling domestic governmental
forms, given that control over external affairs had until independence been ‘matters for
the Government of  the United Kingdom’.97 The Commonwealth, Jennings suggested,
might be a source of  friendly advice, information and diplomatic connections.98 The
danger, however, was of  African alignment with communist bloc states, determined to
undermine democratic systems, and importing their ideologies alongside international aid
and advice.99 More abstractly, Jennings argued that the very existence of  independent
states necessarily led to international ‘competition’, and that each state tends to press its
internal political organisation and culture as the mark of  the ideal.100 But despite all these
international challenges, Jennings concluded that the greater ones remained internal.
Constitutions could provide some solutions for self-government, but their success
remained for the men – and, Jennings added, women – in public service.101
Conclusion: dissolutions
This article has shown how the transformations and fall of  the Empire motivated
Jennings’ radical rethinking of  the domestic and international in a range of  projects
around empire, administration and international community. What began as a focus on
the interaction of  imperial–constitutional law with the new international legal system,
turned to the uses of  the ‘rule of  law’ to guide the development of  international laws and,
finally, post-war projects of  European federation, decolonised independence and human
rights. At that point, the dissolution of  the British Empire in the 1950s and 1960s, its
replacement with the Commonwealth, and the shift in Western hegemonic power from
Britain to America had turned the Empire’s global connections of  power and law into
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ones of  imposed culture and inescapable history; the real power and law having gone
elsewhere to the conflicts of  the Cold War.102 British visions of  the international and
domestic did not cease so much as turn to a different field: general jurisprudence. While
Jennings drafted new constitutions for the decolonising world and lectured Asian and
African jurists and state leaders, H L A Hart’s analytic legal positivist ‘revival’ of  John
Austin’s perspective influentially contended once more that international law lacked the
status of  law, for lack of  sovereign or command, and could not be analogised to domestic
law, where these elements were central.103 Hart’s vision seemed aimed at the failures of
the League, the internationalism of  the decolonising world, and the apparent ‘deadlock’
of  current international institutions that, in the midst of  the Cold War, could neither
lawfully command nor protect in service of  any ideology, but instead operated only
through force, if  at all.104 The complexities of  the debates over the relationship of
international and domestic law now came to be dominated more by the intricacies of
linguistic usage. This dissolved into an analytic project that tried to abstract itself  from
the world events and the rise of  public and international law and power, intimately
connected to the Empire, that had made Jennings’ attempts to understand and link or
distinguish them so urgent and important. Those events and the new roles for the
international and domestic in justifying intervention and internal legal rearrangements
according to capitalism or socialism would come to burn through the Cold War unabated,
amid the flexing of  new imperial powers. 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 71(2)
102  On law and the end of  (British) Empire, see Charlotte Peevers, The Politics of  Justifying Force: The Suez Crisis,
the Iraq War, and International Law (Oxford University Press 2013) ch 3, ‘The Suez Crisis’; Adom Getachew,
Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of  Self-Determination (Princeton University Press 2019). On new
global political ideologies in the war and its aftermath, see Or Rosenboim, The Emergence of  Globalism: Visions
of  World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939–50 (Princeton University Press 2017).
103  H L A Hart, The Concept of  Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 1961) ch x.
104  On Hart, primitive law and decolonisation, see Coel Kirkby, ‘Law evolves: the uses of  primitive law in
Anglo-American concepts of  modern law, 1861–1961’ (2018) 58 American Journal of  Legal History 535.
On Cold War, see further Luis Eslava et al (eds), Bandung, Global History and International Law: Critical Pasts
and Pending Futures (Cambridge University Press 2017); Matt Craven et al (eds), International Law and the Cold
War (Cambridge University Press 2019).
174
